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1 Introduction 
With the convergence of mobile communications, sensors and online social networks 
technologies, an exponential amount of personal data - either freely disclosed by 
users or transparently acquired by sensors - end up in servers. This massive 
amount of data, the new oil, represents an unprecedented potential for applications 
and business (e.g., car insurance billing, traffic decongestion, smart grids 
optimization, healthcare surveillance, participatory sensing). However, centralizing 
and processing all one’s data in a single server incurs a major problem with regards 
to privacy. Indeed, individuals’ data is carefully scrutinized by governmental 
agencies and companies in charge of processing it [de Montjoye et al. 2012]. Privacy 
violations also arise from negligence and attacks and no current server-based 
approach, including cryptography based and server-side secure hardware [Agrawal 
et al. 2002], seems capable of closing the gap. Conversely, decentralized 
architectures (e.g., personal data vault), providing better control to the user over the 
management of her personal data, impede global computations by construction. 
To reconcile privacy protection and global computation to the best benefit of the individuals, 
the community and the companies, [To et al. 2014] capitalizes on a novel 
architectural approach called Trusted Cells [Anciaux et al. 2013]. Trusted Cells 
push the security to the edges of the network, through personal data servers [Allard 
et al. 2010] running on secure smart phones, set-top boxes, plug computers1 or 
secure portable tokens2 forming a global decentralized data platform. Indeed, 
thanks to the emergence of low-cost secure hardware and firmware technologies like 
ARM TrustZone3, a full Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) will soon be present 
in any client device. 
As discussed in [Anciaux et al. 2013], trusted hardware is more and more versatile 
and has become a key enabler for all applications where trust is required at the 
edges of the network. Figure 1 depicts different scenarios where a Trusted Data 
Server (TDS) is called to play a central role, by reestablishing the capacity to 
perform global computations without revealing any sensitive information to central 
                                                          
1http://freedomboxfoundation.org/  
2 http://www.gd-sfs.com/portable-security-token  
3 http://www.arm.com/products/processors/technologies/trustzone.php  
 servers. TDS can be integrated in energy smart meters to gather energy 
consumption raw data, to locally perform aggregate queries for billing or smart grid 
optimization purpose and externalize only certified results, thereby reconciling 
individuals' privacy and energy providers’ benefits. Green button4 is another 
application example where individuals accept sharing their data with their 
neighborhood through distributed queries for their personal benefit. Similarly, TDS 
can be integrated in GPS trackers to protect individuals' privacy while securely 
computing insurance fees or carbon tax and participating in general interest 
distributed services such as traffic jam reduction. Moreover, TDSs can be hosted in 
personal devices to implement secure personal folders like e.g., PCEHR (Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Record) fed by the individuals themselves thanks to 
the Blue Button initiative5 and/or quantified-self devices. Distributed queries are 
useful in this context to help epidemiologists performing global surveys or allow 
patients suffering from the same illness to share their data in a controlled manner. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Different scenarios of TDSs 
 
The architecture [To et al. 2014] considers is decentralized by nature. It is formed 
by a large set of low power TDSs embedded in secure devices. Despite the diversity 
of existing hardware platforms, a secure device can be abstracted by (1) a Trusted 
Execution Environment and (2) a (potentially untrusted but cryptographically 
protected) mass storage area (see Fig. 2)6. E.g., the former can be provided by a 
tamper-resistant microcontroller while the latter can be provided by Flash memory. 
The important assumption is that the TDS code is executed by the secure device 
hosting it and thus cannot be tampered, even by the TDS holder herself. Each TDS 
exhibits the following properties: High security, modest computing resource, and 
low availability.  
                                                          
4 http://www.greenbuttondata.org/  
5 http://healthit.gov/patients-families/your-health-data   
6 For illustration purpose, the secure device considered in our experiments is made of a tamper-resistant microcontroller 
connected to a Flash memory chip.  
 Since TDSs have limited storage and computing resources and they are not 
necessarily always connected, an external infrastructure, called hereafter 
Supporting Server Infrastructure (SSI), is required to manage the communications 
between TDSs, run the distributed query protocol and store the intermediate 
results produced by this protocol. Because SSI is implemented on regular server(s), 
e.g., in the Cloud, it exhibits the same low level of trustworthiness, high computing 
resources, and availability. 
 
Fig. 2. Trusted Data Servers 
 
Hence, even if there exist differences among Secure Devices (e.g., smart tokens 
are more robust against tampering but less powerful than TrustZone devices), all 
provide much stronger security guarantees combined with a much weaker 
availability and computing power than any traditional server. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The Asymmetric Architecture 
 
The computing architecture, illustrated in Fig. 3 is said asymmetric in the sense 
that it is composed of a very large number of low power, weakly connected but 
highly secure TDSs and of a powerful, highly available but untrusted SSI. 
TDSs are the unique elements of trust in the architecture and are considered 
honest. As mentioned earlier, no trust assumption needs to be made on the TDS 
holder herself because a TDS is tamper-resistant and enforces the access control 
rules associated to its holder (just like a car driver cannot tamper the GPS tracker 
installed in her car by its insurance company or a customer cannot gain access to 
any secret data stored in her banking smartcard).  
 We primarily consider honest-but-curious (also called semi-honest) SSI (i.e., which 
tries to infer any information it can but strictly follows the protocol), concentrating 
on the prevention of confidentiality attacks.  
The objective of [To et al. 2014] is to implement a querying protocol so that (1) the 
querier can gain access only to the final result of authorized queries (not to the raw 
data participating in the computation), as in a traditional database system and (2) 
intermediate results stored in SSI are obfuscated. To ensure the confidentiality of 
this protocol, the shared keys between Querier and TDSs play an important role, 
and therefore an adaptive key exchange protocol suitable to TDSs context is 
necessary. 
The aim of this technical report is to complement the work in [To et al. 2014] by 
proposing a Group Key Exchange protocol so that the Querier and TDSs (and TDSs 
themselves) can securely create and exchange the shared key. Then, the security of 
this protocol is formally proved using the game-based model. Finally, we perform 
the comparison between this protocol and other related works. 
2 State-of-the-Art on Group Key Management 
Group Key Exchange (GKE) protocols can be roughly classified into three classes: 
centralized, decentralized, and distributed [Rafaeli and Hutchison 2003]. In 
centralized group key protocols, a single entity is employed to control the whole 
group and is responsible for distributing group keys to group members. In the 
decentralized approaches, a set of group managers is responsible for managing the 
group as opposed to a single entity. In the distributed method, group members 
themselves contribute to the formation of group keys and are equally responsible for 
the re-keying and distribution of group keys. Their analysis [Rafaeli and Hutchison 
2003] made clear that there is no unique solution that can satisfy all requirements. 
While centralized key management schemes are easy to implement, they tend to 
impose an overhead on a single entity. Decentralized protocols are relatively harder 
to implement and raise other issues, such as interfering with the data path or 
imposing security hazards on the group. Finally, distributed key management, by 
design, is simply not scalable. Hence it is important to understand fully the 
requirements of the application to select the most suitable GKE protocol. Under the 
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, some works [Wu et al. 2011, Bresson et 
al. 2004] proposed group key exchange protocol suitable for low-power devices. 
These works achieve communication efficiency because they require only two 
communication rounds to establish the shared key. They also require little 
computing resources of participants and are thus suitable for the Trusted Data 
Server (TDS) context [To et al. 2014b].   
 3 Overview of Key Management 
There are numerous ways to share the keys between TDSs and Querier depending 
on which context we consider.  
In the closed context, we assume that all TDSs are produced by the same 
provider, so the shared key kT can be installed into TDSs at manufacturing time. If 
Querier also owns a TDS, key kQ can be installed at manufacturing time as well. 
Otherwise, Querier must create a private/public key and can use another way (PKI 
or GKE described below) to exchange key kQ. An illustrative scenario for the closed 
context can be: patients and physicians in a hospital get each a TDS from the 
hospital, all TDSs being produced by the same manufacturer, so that the required 
cryptographic material is preinstalled in all TDSs before queries are executed.   
In an open context, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be used so that 
queriers and TDSs all have a public-private key pair. When a TDS or querier 
registers for an application, it gets the required symmetric keys encrypted with its 
own public key. Since the total number of TDS manufacturers is assumed to be very 
small (in comparison with the total number of TDSs) and all the TDSs produced by 
the same producer have the same private/public key pair, the total number of 
private/public key pairs in the whole system is not big. Therefore, deploying a PKI 
in our architecture is suitable since it does not require an enormous investment in 
managing a very large number of private/public key pairs (i.e., proportional to the 
number of TDSs). PKI can be used to exchange both keys kQ and kT for both Querier 
cases i.e. owning a token or not. In the case we want to exchange kT, we can apply 
the above protocol for kQ with Querier being replaced by one of the TDSs. This TDS 
can be chosen randomly or based on its connection time (e.g., the TDS that has the 
longest connection time to SSI will be chosen).  
An illustrative scenario for the open context can be: TDSs are integrated in smart 
phones produced by different smart phone producers. Each producer has many 
models (e.g., iPhone 1-6 of Apple, Galaxy S1-S5 of Samsung, Xperia Z1-Z4 of 
Sony…) and we assume that it installs the same private/public key on each model. 
In total, there are about one hundred models in the current market, so the number 
of different private/public keys is manageable. The phone’s owner can then securely 
take part in surveys such as: what is the volume of 4G data people living in Paris 
consume in one month, group by network operators (Orange, SFR…). 
In PKI, only one entity creates the whole secret key, and securely transfers it to 
the others. In the distributed key agreement protocols, however, there is no 
centralized key server available. This arrangement is justified in many situations—
e.g., in peer-to-peer or ad hoc networks where centralized resources are not readily 
available or are not fully trusted to generate the shared key entirely. Moreover, an 
advantage of distributed protocols over the centralized protocols is the increase in 
system reliability, because the group key is generated in a shared and contributory 
fashion and there is no single-point-of-failure [Lee et al. 2006]. Group AKE protocols 
are essential for secure collaborative (peer-to-peer) applications [Lee et al. 2006]. In 
these circumstances, every participant wishes to contribute part of its secrecy to 
 generate the shared key such that no party can predetermine the resulting value. In 
other words, no party is allowed to choose the group key on behalf of the whole 
group. These reasons lead to another way to exchange the shared key between TDSs 
and Querier in the open context. In this way, we use the GKE [Wu et al. 2011, Amir 
et al. 2004, Wu et al. 2008] so that Querier can securely exchange the secret 
contributive key to all TDSs. Some GKE protocols [Amir et al. 2004] require a 
broadcast operation in which a participant sends part of the key to the rest. These 
protocols are not suitable for our architecture since TDSs communicate together 
indirectly through SSI. This incurs a lot of operations for SSI to broadcast the 
messages (i.e., O(n2), with n is the number of participants). Other protocols [Wu et 
al. 2008] overcome this weakness by requiring that participants form a tree 
structure to reduce the communication cost. Unfortunately, SSI has no knowledge 
in advance about TDSs thus this tree cannot be built. The work in [Wu et al. 2011] 
proposes a protocol with two rounds of communications and only one broadcast 
operation. However, this protocol still has the inherent weakness of the GKE: all 
participants must connect during the key exchange phase. This characteristic does 
not fit in our architecture since TDSs are weakly connected. Finally, the Broadcast 
Encryption Scheme (BES) [Castelluccia et al. 2005] requires that all participants 
have a shared secret in advance, preventing us from using it in a context where 
TDSs are produced by different manufacturers. 
In consequence, we propose an adaptive GKE scheme, fitting our architecture as 
follows.   
4 The Adaptive Key Exchange Protocol 
Let p, q be two large primes satisfying p = 2q + 1; Gq be a subgroup of Zp* with the 
order q; g be a generator of the group Gq; H1, H2 be two one-way hash functions such 
that H1, H2: {0, 1}* -> Zq*; SID be a public session identity (note that each session is 
assigned a unique SID). Without loss of generality, let {Q, U1, U2,…, Un} be a set of 
participants who want to generate a group secret key, where Q is the Querier and 
U1, U2,…, Un are TDSs. This dynamic GKE protocol is depicted in Fig. 7 and the 
detailed steps are described as follows: 
Step 1: Each client Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) computes ri = MAC(SID, Kpi) which is the 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) of the session identity SID, using a key 
derived from Kpi and zi = gri mod p, as well as a signature σi of zi under Kpi which is 
the private key of TDSi. Then, each Ui sends (σi, zi) to SSI. Since all TDSs produced 
by the same producer share the same private/public key pair (Kpi, Kpui), they 
generate the same zi. When this collection phase stops, SSI forwards all these (σi, zi) 
to Querier Q. 
Step 2: Querier Q first selects two random values r0, r ∈ Zq* and computes z0 = gr0 
mod p. Upon receiving n pairs (σi, zi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n), Querier eliminates the duplicated zi, 
(we assume that there remains only m pairs (σi, zi) with distinct zi). Since the 
number of producers is very small in comparison with the number of TDSs, we have 
m << n. For each m pairs (σi, zi), Querier Q checks the signature σi using public key 
 Kpui of each Ui and if they are all correct, Q computes xi = zir0 mod p and yi = 
H2(xi|| SID) ⊕ r for i=1, 2,…, m. Finally, Q computes the shared session key SK = 
H2(r||y1||y2||…||ym||SID), a signature σ0 of z0 and broadcasts (σ0, y1, y2…, ym, 
z0, SID) to all TDSs. Since m << n, the length of the broadcast message 
(σ0,y1,y2…,ym,z0, SID) is very short, saving network bandwidth. 
Step 3: Upon receiving the messages (σ0, y1, y2…, ym, z0, SID), each TDSi verifies 
the signature σ0 and then can compute xi and r = yi ⊕ H2(xi || SID) and uses r to 
obtain the shared key SK = H2(r||y1||y2||…||ym||SID). In this step, even if 
some TDSs did not participate in the first step of the protocol, they still can get the 
secret group key SK because they can use their private key and the public hash 
function H1 to compute the value ri that all the TDSs belonging to the same 
manufacturer can compute. This characteristic reflects the adaptive property of this 
protocol since it is suitable for our context in which all participants do not need to 
connect during the key exchange phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Adaptive Group Key Exchange Protocol 
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 mod p 
σn = sign(zn, Kpn) 
σ1, z1 σ2, z2 σn, zn 
Querier Q 
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 mod p 
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SK = H2(r || y1 || y2 || … || ym || SID) 
σ0, y1, y2,…, ym, z0, SID 
(U1) TDS1 
verify (σ0) 
x1 = z0
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 mod p 
r = y1 ⊕ H2(x1 || SID)  
SK = H2(r || {yi}i=1..m || SID) 
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verify (σ0) 
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r2
 mod p 
r = y2 ⊕ H2(x2 || SID)  
SK = H2(r || {yi}i=1..m || SID) 
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verify (σ0) 
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SK = H2(r || {yi}i=1..m || SID) 
… 
… 
 5 Security Analysis of the Adaptive Key Exchange Protocol 
Formally, there are five notions of security [Bresson and Manulis 2007] used as 
the standards to evaluate the security of a GKE protocol as follows:  
 Authenticated key exchange (AKE): requires the indistinguishability of 
computed group keys from random keys. 
 Forward/backward secrecy [Wu et al. 2011]: requires that other participants 
need not to re-run the protocol when a participant joins/leaves the group.   
 Contributiveness: requires that all protocol participants equally contribute to 
the computation of the group key. These requirements implicitly state a 
difference between PKI and GKE protocols in the spirit of generating the key 
 Universal Composability (UC) [Katz and Shin 2005]: requires that protocol is 
secure against insider impersonation attacks.  
 Mutual Authentication (MA): requires that all protocol participants are 
ensured to actually compute the same key. 
Since our protocol is closely adapted from protocol in [Bresson et al. 2004] which 
is already formally proved to be AKE-secure, we just point out the difference 
between these two protocols and show that this difference does not affect the 
security of protocol. To do that, we first prove that the secret value ri generated by 
each TDS is indistinguishable from random number, then we use the game-based 
model inspired by [Bresson et al. 2004] to formally prove that our protocol is AKE-
secure.  
The only difference between the two protocols is the way the secret value ri (that 
contributes to the shared key) in each TDS is generated. In Bresson's protocol, the 
value ri is randomly generated. In our solution, TDSs cannot simply randomly 
generate ri because the adaptive property (i.e., all TDSs from a same manufacturer 
generate the same ri so that not all participants need to connect during the key 
exchange phase) will be lost. The solution we propose is to compute ri as the MAC of 
an SID, using a key derived from Kpi: ri = MAC(SID, Kpi). This way, all TDSs from 
the same manufacturer will return the same ri for a given SID because they possess 
the same Kpi, and as long as a querier cannot replay an SID7, the answers will be 
unpredictable for the querier. Since SID is random for each session and the value ri 
is derived from secret key Kpi and the SID using a random oracle, MAC(SID, Kpi) is 
indistinguishable from random ri. In other words, our scheme is indistinguishable 
from the original scheme of Bresson. 
The philosophy of this proof is largely inspired by [Bresson et al. 2004] and part 
of the text is borrowed from this paper. For the detail formal proof of security, 
interested readers can refer to [Bresson et al. 2004]. 
Note that for the security of the proposed protocol, given the Diffie-Hellman 
problem (see below), we make the following classical DDH and CDH assumptions, 
and assume there exists a secure one-way hash function. 
                                                          
7 We need to put in place a mechanism to ensure that SIDs cannot be reused. For example, TDSs could store them in their 
internal DBs and only reply to queries using a fresh SID. 
 Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem: Given ya = gx1 mod p and yb = gx2 
mod p for some x1, x2 ∈ Z*q, the DDH problem is to distinguish two tuples (ya, yb, 
gx1x2 mod p) and (ya, yb, R ∈ Gq) where R is a random value in a (multiplicative) 
cyclic group Gq of order q. 
DDH assumption: There exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can 
solve the DDH problem with a non-negligible advantage. 
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given a tuple (g, gx1 mod p, 
gx2 mod p) for some x1, x2 ∈ Z*q, the CDH problem is to compute the value gx1x2 mod 
p ∈ Gq.  
CDH assumption: There exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can 
solve the CDH problem with a non-negligible advantage. Formally, a (t, ε)-CDH 
attacker in G is a probabilistic machine ∆ running in time t such that: 
SuccGcdh(∆) = Prx1,x2 [∆(gx1,gx2) = gx1x2] ≥ ε  
The CDH problem is (t, ε)-intractable if there is no (t, ε)-attacker in G. The CDH 
assumption states that is the case for all polynomial t and any non-negligible ε.  
Hash function assumption: A secure one-way hash function H: X={0,1}* -> 
Y=Z*q must satisfy following requirements: 
(i) for any y ∈ Y, it is hard to find x ∈ X such that H(x)=y. 
(ii) for any x ∈ X, it is hard to find x’ ∈ X such that x’ ≠ x and H(x’) = H(x). 
(iii) it is hard to find x, x’ ∈ X such that x’ ≠ x and H(x)=H(x’).   
Adversarial Model: we consider an adversary A which is a Probabilistic 
Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithm having complete control over the network. A can 
invoke protocol execution and interact with protocol participants via queries to their 
oracles. We model the capabilities of A through the following queries: 
- Adversary A can send arbitrary messages to Q using the SendQ-query.  
- Adversary A can send arbitrary messages to TDSi using the Send-query.  
- Known-key attacks are modeled by the Reveal-query. This query allows the 
adversary A to learn the value of a particular session key SK if participant has 
computed the key. 
- Test-query: is used to model the AKE-security of a protocol. This query is 
answered as follows: The oracle generates a random bit b. If b = 1 then A is given 
session key SK, and if b = 0 then A is given a random string.      
To prove that the proposed protocol is AKE-secure, we apply the Bresson’s Game-
based security model [Bresson et al. 2004] by using a sequence of games G0 through 
G3, in which we simulate the protocol and consider A attacking the simulated 
protocol.  
      We denote by b the bit involved in the Test-query, by b’ the guess output by A, 
by qs the total number of Send-queries asked to the participants. We refer in game 
Gi the event Si as being b=b’. When Test-query is asked, A gets back either SK if bit 
b=1 or a random string of same length if b=0. When A terminates, it outputs a 
single bit b’. Semantic security means that A does not learn any information about 
SK and has no advantage to guess the bit b. So we define the advantage of 
adversary A to guess bit b for our protocol P in the game as:  
 AdvPake(A) = |Prb’[b’=1||b=1] – Prb’[b’=1||b=0]| = 2 Prb,b’[b=b’] - 1. 
A protocol P is an (t, ε)-secure AKE if AdvPake(A) is less than ε for all probabilistic 
adversary A which running time is bounded by t.  
Game G0. The Querier Q is given z0=gr0 mod p and each TDS is given a pair of 
private/public key, and computes zi. We thus have: 
Pr[S0] = (AdvPake(A) + 1)/2   (1) 
Game G1. The security notion for a signature scheme is that it is computationally 
infeasible for an adversary to produce a valid forgery σ with respect to any message 
me under a chosen-message attack (CMA) [Bresson and Manulis 2007]. It is (t,qs,ε)–
CMA-secure if there is no adversary A which can get a probability greater than ɛ 
(denoted as SuccSIGNcma(A)) in mounting an existential forgery under a CMA attack 
within time t, after qs signing queries. We refer to Forge as the event that A asks for 
a SendQ(me’)-query, such that the verification of the signature is correct and me’ 
was not previously output by a client as an answer to another Send-query. In this 
case, we abort the game and fix b’ randomly. The game G1 and G0 are similar as 
long as Forge does not happen. By guessing the impersonated client, one easily gets: 
|Pr[S1]-Pr[S0]| ≤ Pr[Forge] ≤ me*SuccSIGNcma(t,qs)  (2) 
Game G2. We are given a Diffie-Hellman triple (A=gα, B=gβ, C=gγ) with the values 
α, β (and thus γ = α*β mod q), and define r ← α, z ← A= gα. Furthermore, exponent ri 
is defined by β + σi mod q, and zi ←Bgσi. So, αi is set to CAσi:  
Pr[S2]=Pr[S1]    (3) 
Game G3. Any hash value involving an xi or yi (either H2(xi||SID) or 
H2(r||{yi}i=1..m||SID)) asked by TDSs or Q are answered independently from the 
random oracles. Since the same hash queries, asked by the adversary, are still 
answered by querying the random oracles, some inconsistency may occur. Such an 
inconsistency is discovered by the adversary if such a hash query is asked by the 
adversary, event which we denote by AskH:  
|Pr[S3] - Pr[S2]| ≤ Pr[AskH]         (4) 
Such an event AskH means that some xi (among at most qs) appears in the list of 
the hash queries. By guessing the αi instance that has been asked by the adversary, 
and the corresponding hash query, one can extracts C= αi * A-σi: 
Pr[AskH] ≤ qHqs * SuccGcdh(t)  (5) 
with qs active requests, and qH queries to the hash oracles.  
From (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5), we conclude that: 
AdvPake(A) ≤ 2me*SuccSIGNcma(t,qs) + qHqs * SuccGcdh(t). 
This inequality shows that our protocol P is AKE secure, according to the AKE 
definition above. 
To prove the contributiveness, we can see that after Q broadcasts (σ0, y1, y2…, ym, 
z0, SID) to all TDSs, each TDS can use its own secret ri to compute the value r and 
then obtains an identical group key SK. This means the following equations hold: 
SK = H2(r||{yi}i=1..m||SID) = H2(y1 ⊕ H2(z0r1|| SID)||{yi}i=1..m||SID) 
= H2(y2 ⊕ H2(z0r2|| SID)||{yi}i=1..m||SID)  
= H2(ym ⊕ H2(z0rm|| SID)||{yi}i=1..m||SID) 
 Set V = y1 ⊕ H2(z0r1|| SID) = y2 ⊕ H2(z0r2|| SID) = … = ym ⊕ H2(z0rm|| SID). It 
implies y1 = H2(z0r1|| SID) ⊕ V, y2 = H2(z0r2|| SID) ⊕ V, …, ym = H2(z0rm|| SID) ⊕ 
V. Obviously, each yi includes the participant TDS’s secret value ri for i=1..m. By the 
group key SK = H2(r||{yi}i=1..m||SID) = H2(y1 ⊕ H2(z0r1|| SID)||{yi}i=1..m||SID), 
each participant ensures that his contribution has been involved in the group key 
SK, providing contributiveness of the protocol.  
To prove the forward/backward secrecy for member joining/leaving, we first adopt 
this lemma (proved in [Wu et al. 2011]): Assume that three secret parameters a, b, 
and c are randomly selected from Zp*. If an adversary knows two values H(a) ⊕ b 
and H(a) ⊕ c, then the secret a and b are not computable under the hash function 
assumption.  
Assume a new TDS Um+1 belonging to a new manufacturer wants to join the 
group. Um+1 sends zm+1 = grm+1 mod p to Q. Then, Q selects r’ ∈ Zq* and computes y’i 
(i=1..m+1) with a new SID’. Finally, Q broadcasts (σ0, y’1, y’2…, y’m+1, z0, SID’) to all 
TDSs. All TDSs can compute a new group key SK’= 
H2(r’||y’1||y’2||…||y’m+1||SID’) with r’=y’i ⊕ H2(z0ri|| SID’). We want to prove 
that the new TDS Um+1 cannot compute the previous group key SK= 
H2(r||y1||y2||…||ym||SID). Um+1 can record all the previous transmitted 
messages (zi = gri mod p, yi, SID) for i=0..m. Obviously, Um+1 can compute the key 
SK only when he can get the value r or xi .  
In the first case, due to the CDH assumption, it is hard to compute gro*ri mod p = 
xi, given a tuple (g, z0=gr0 mod p, zi = gri mod p), making it impossible for Um+1 to 
obtain xi from zi. 
In the second case, Um+1 can get the value r or xi from (yi, y’i, SID, SID’) for 
i=1..m, where yi = H2(xi||SID) ⊕ r and y’i = H2(xi||SID’) ⊕ r’. Without loss 
generality, we set a =  xi||SID = xi||SID’, b=r, and c=r’ such that yi = H(a) ⊕ b and 
y’i = H(a) ⊕ c. Applying above lemma, we prove that the values a and b are not 
computable under the hash function assumption. Hence, obtaining the value r or xi 
is also impossible. 
In both cases, Um+1 cannot compute the previous group key SK, proving the 
forward secrecy of our protocol. By applying the same technique, we can prove that 
our protocol also provides backward secrecy. 
In short, our protocol achieves two goals: (i) Each TDS has to generate random 
secret values (to ensure that the protocol is AKE-secure), and (ii) all TDSs from a 
same manufacturer contribute the same secret value (to guarantee the adaptivity of 
our protocol in the TDSs context).  
While AKE-security became meanwhile standard to prove security of GKE, it 
does not take into account any notion of protection against insider attacks, and thus 
AKE-secure protocols may be completely insecure against attacks by malicious 
insiders [Katz and Shin 2005]. To encompass these attacks, [Katz and Shin 2005] 
proposed a compiler that can convert any AKE-secure GKE protocol into an UC-
secure GKE protocol which ensures security against insider attacks.  
 This compiler was then extended by [Bresson and Manulis 2007] to support MA-
security. This extended compiler, called C-MACON, can be used to transform any 
AKE-secure GKE protocol into a GKE protocol which is additionally MA-secure. 
Seeing GKE protocols as building blocks for high-level applications, these two 
add-on compilers allow to enhance security of a protocol in a black-box manner, that 
is, independently of the implementation of the protocol being enhanced [Bresson et 
al. 2007]. In other words, a security-enhancing GKE compiler C is a procedure 
which takes as input a GKE protocol P and outputs a compiled GKE protocol CP 
with additional security properties possibly missing in P.  
Since C-MACON is the extension of compiler in [Katz and Shin 2005], we can apply 
this compiler to our protocol P, which is already AKE-secure as proved above, to 
create a new GKE protocol C-MACONP that achieves all notions of security listed 
above. Then, the interesting question is how much overhead incurred for the 
compiled GKE protocol C-MACONP in compared with the original protocol P. C-
MACONP achieves MA-security at an additional cost of only two communication 
rounds, which is an acceptable overhead. The following section details this overhead 
on each TDS when we apply this compiler.               
Note that, even if SSI also possesses a TDS, it still cannot access the key shared 
between TDSs. As stated above, TDS code and content cannot be tampered, even by 
its holder. The only information that SSI in possession of a TDS can see is a stream 
of encrypted tuples [To et al. 2014b]. 
6 The Efficiency of the Adaptive Key Exchange Protocol 
This method has two advantages in terms of asynchronous connection and 
performance over other GKEs in literature. First, this adaptive protocol perfectly 
fits our weakly connected assumption regarding the participating TDSs. 
Specifically, this protocol does not require that all TDSs connect at the same time to 
form the group, the connection of a single TDS per manufacturer being enough. The 
encrypted kT could be stored temporarily on SSI so that the offline TDS can get it as 
soon as it comes online and still take part in the protocol (i.e., any TDS that 
connects later can use its private key to compute the ri, then SK, and after that can 
participate into the computation). Second, even if a TDS opts out of a SQL query in 
the collection phase, it can still contribute to the parallel computation in the 
aggregation phase. With a traditional distributed key exchange, any TDS 
disconnected during setup will require a new key exchange to take place. With our 
protocol, each TDS contributes to part of the shared secret key, the only 
requirement is that at least one TDS per manufacturer participates in step 1 to 
contribute to the value ri representing this manufacturer. 
In terms of performance, this protocol is not a burden because it requires only 2-
round of communications as shown in Fig. 7. Furthermore, the first round can be 
combined with the collection phase, helping reduce the protocol to only one phase. 
To compare our protocol with other solutions in literature in term of performance, 
we first denote the following notations: 
 Tsig: time to execute a signature operation (signing or verifying). 
Texp: time to execute an exponentiation operation. 
TH: time to execute an one-way hash function.  
Tper: time to execute an one-way permutation (used in C-MACON). 
Tpsf: time to execute a pseudorandom function (used in C-MACON). 
We compare communication cost (i.e., number of rounds) and computational cost 
on each TDS among four protocols: our protocol (P), our protocol plus C-MACON 
compiler applied to our protocol (P + C-MACONP), Bresson’s protocol (PB) in [Bresson 
et al. 2004], and Wu’s protocol (PW) in [Wu et al. 2011]. These protocols have one 
thing in common: they address the GKE protocols for low power mobile devices. 
Table 1 summarizes the comparison among these protocols. 
 
 PB PW P P + C-MACONP 
Number of rounds 2 2 2 4 
Computational cost 
on each TDS 
2Texp + TH + Tsig 2Texp + 2TH 2Texp + 3TH + 2Tsig 2Texp + 3TH + (m+3)Tsig + 
mTper + mTpsf 
Table 1. Performance comparison among GKE protocols. 
 
From Table 1, it is easy to see that to obtain stronger notions of security, each 
participant in that protocol must spend more cost for hashing, verifying the 
signatures and other operations.       
 
Similar to PKI, adaptive GKE can be used to exchange keys kQ and kT in both cases 
of Querier. However, although PKI and GKE are both based on the private/public 
keys in the open context, they differ in the way to generate the shared key. PKI is 
centralized and needs to trust the certification authority (which is a single point of 
attack) to generate the shared key. In contrast, with the adaptive GKE every TDS 
contributes part of the secret to generate the shared key. 
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